The Growth of Christianity in China May Have Come to an End

Discussions about the continuing expansion of Christianity in China in recent decades often cite government statistics, church membership reports, linear projections of Christian growth, and ethnographic studies.¹ Few studies rely on nationally representative surveys to understand Christian trends in China, perhaps in part because several large-scale surveys with religion measures only became publicly available in the 2010s.

Over the past decade, several nationally representative survey projects have been conducted by academic groups in China, allowing researchers to explore the demographic and geographic characteristics of Chinese Christians. Some surveys, such as the CGSS, have consistently asked about Christian affiliation over time, making it possible to investigate religious trends since the early 2000s.

Studies based on national survey data—those with repeated measures on religion—have shed light on religious trends in recent decades.⁷ They found evidence supporting China’s religious revival in the 1990s and the early 2000s, but not in mid-2000s or 2010s. For instance, using data from the four waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), Hu (2017) found that although the level of perceived importance of religion increased between 1990 and 2001, the growth was not observed in the 2007 and 2012 waves of the WVS.⁸ Zhang et al. (2022) examined the patterns of religious nonaffiliation in all the nationally representative surveys conducted between 1990 and 2018, including the CGSS, and found that after controlling for differences in question wording and format of the religious affiliation measure across surveys, the level of religious nonaffiliation declined during the 1990s and 2000s, but the changes since 2006 are not statistically significant (Zhang et al. 2022). Using data from the CGSS conducted between 2006 and 2021, Zhou et al. (2024) found no evidence of rising religious affiliation among Chinese residents since 2010.

A few quantitative studies focus on trends in Christianity. Some scholars have claimed to find survey evidence of continued Christian growth in the twenty-first century. Using data from a 1995 survey conducted by the HorizonKey company and a 2005 survey carried out by Religious Experience Research Centre at the University of Wales and the Ian Ramsey Centre at the University of Oxford, Yao (2007) presented results that the share of respondents who “believe in God/Jesus grew from 2.2% to 5.8%” between 1995 and 2005 as evidence for the rapid growth in religious beliefs in China, even though Yao acknowledged in the article that the statistics from the two surveys might not be comparable because of their differences in sampling coverage. It is also unclear whether the belief questions were asked in the same wording and format in the two surveys, factors that research has shown to have considerable effect on the results (Pew Research Center 2023c; Zhang et al. 2022). Hu and Leamaster (2015) examined the intergenerational transmission of religious affiliation using the 2010 CGSS and found some evidence supporting Christian growth among adults born in the reform era (after 1978): Christian fathers are more successful at passing down their religion than fathers identifying with traditional Chinese religions, and children of parents tied to traditional Chinese religions are more likely to “convert” to Christianity than children of Christians to “convert” to traditional religions.

Quantitative data from repeated surveys paints a different picture. Francis-Tan and Tian (2022) analyzed longitudinal data from the China Family Panel Studies in 2012 and 2016 and found that the Christian share remained largely stable between two waves, even though there was a considerable level of movement into and out of Christianity, measured by the share of respondents who switched answers between years. Using multiple waves of data from CGSS, Zhou et al. (2024) observed higher levels of affiliation with Christianity (and religion in general) among Chinese adults born in the 1960s, who grew up during the Cultural Revolution and entered adulthood in the initial stages of China’s reform era, than those born in the 1970s and later. On the basis of this cohort pattern, they argued that that the revival of Christianity (and religion) in China was a transient phenomenon and did not continue into the 2010s.

Nevertheless, when scholars and journalists discuss the putative continued growth of Christianity in the twenty-first century, they rarely cite analysis of repeated measures of Christian identity in nationally representative surveys over time. Instead, they tend to contrast one survey data point with a different type of data or else they rely entirely on nonsurvey data.

Existing research has documented limitations of using surveys to measure Christianity and how it is changing in China. Some scholars contend that Chinese surveys asking about religious affiliation produce an undercount of Christians, because some Christians, particularly those who worship in unauthorized churches, may not agree to be interviewed or divulge their religious identity to interviewers. In the religion magazine First Things, Stark, Johnson, and Mencken (2011) briefly mentioned a study in which about 1 in 10 presumed Christians who agreed to be interviewed did not admit to being Christian when asked (unfortunately, details of this study have not appeared in any peer-reviewed journal). Likewise, members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who are prohibited from holding a religious affiliation, might not disclose their Christian affiliation. Sampling variation also could influence results. Christian figures may vary slightly depending on whether Wenzhou, said to be the most Christian city in China, is included in the sample (Pew Research Center 2023c).⁹

It could be that a modest degree of underreporting of Christian identity is present across surveys because of the sensitivity of measuring religion in China. If so, it is important to evaluate whether there is evidence that such potential underreporting has increased in recent years. If people have grown more likely to conceal Christian identity in recent years, this could make it difficult to see evidence of Christian growth in surveys. However, if underreporting of Christian identity has remained stable (e.g., a 10 percent undercount), then the trend in incidence rates over time should reveal whether Christianity is rapidly growing, even if the measured incidence rate at any point in time is conservative.

The capacity of surveys to accurately reflect religious changes could, for example, be affected by intensifying government control over Christian activity. In a Christianity Today article (Ong 2023), Fenggang Yang expressed doubts about religion results from surveys conducted since 2013, when Xi Jinping became China’s president, saying, “In an environment that is increasingly hostile to religion, who would want to answer survey questions on religion?” This is a valid question but so far, empirical studies have not found evidence of changes in survey response rates, religion item-response rates, or much change in responses to religion measures before and after Xi became the country’s leader. Francis-Tan’s (2023) analysis of longitudinal data from the 2012 and 2016 CFPS suggests that Christian identification is “relatively unresponsive” to the increased government regulations. If this conclusion is accurate, Christian identification patterns in recent surveys should accurately reflect the overall trends of Christianity.

The government’s effort to eradicate unregistered Protestant sites involves not just disbanding churches whose leaders refuse government oversight but also granting legal status to those whose leaders agree to affiliate with the Protestant TSPM committee. This “legalization” process may have removed one reason for people to conceal their Christian identity in recent surveys. Moreover, research suggests that Christians in China may not have clear knowledge regarding whether the church they attend is registered or not. A 2015 survey of Christians in Wuhan city conducted by Han et al. (2018) found about a third of Christians either did not know the legal status of the churches they attend or were misinformed about it.

This study aims to shed light on the trends of Christianity in the past two decades by combing through all available data from nationally representative surveys to examine various claims of ongoing Christian growth. We consider surveys to be the best available tool to discern trends in Christianity in the absence of other high-quality data that tracks the number of Christians in China. And we argue that surveys, especially those that consistently measure Christian affiliation, can provide valuable insights into how Christianity is changing, even if they fail to capture the full number of Christians in China.

Furthermore, in response to the concerns regarding the ability of recent surveys to accurately capture religious trends, we conducted robustness tests to indirectly measure whether policy changes have affected survey participation and responses to religion questions. We examined whether Christians have become less likely to participate in recent surveys. We also analyzed the trends in religious identification among Chinese people to test for any differences between those who are more likely to be affected by the changing policy, such as urban residents, and the rest of the population.

All descriptive statistics, test statistics and regression models were estimated using the standard poststratification weights provided with the corresponding survey. There is one exception: CGSS datasets used in this study have been reweighted so that the combined weighted share of ethnic minority respondents, including Muslim majority ethnic groups, matches the aggregate adult share of these ethnic groups in China’s census.¹³

Some scholars have relied on a mix of fieldwork studies, claims by religious organizations, journalists’ observations and government statistics to argue that China is experiencing a surge of religion and is perhaps even on a path to having a Christian majority by 2050. However, our review of these sources reveals they have serious limitations that cast doubts on claims about continued Christian growth in China in the twenty-first century.

Understanding Christian trends in China is important for understanding Christianity in global context. If Christianity is rapidly growing as a share of China’s population, this is a departure from broad trends in the country’s spiritual landscape (Pew Research Center 2023b). Furthermore, it would be a departure from the general trend in many advanced economies, such as the United States and United Kingdom (Booth and Goodier 2023), where significant declines in Christian shares are occurring (Kramer et al. 2022). If China is experiencing ongoing Christian growth while other large economic powers experience Christian decline, this would be an important phenomenon for social scientists to understand.

Our analysis of data collected across multiple waves of the CGSS, the WVS and other large-scale surveys finds no confirmation of rising levels of Christian identity in China, at least not as measured by formal Christian affiliation. These national surveys provide no clear evidence that Christianity is currently on a growth trajectory. Contrary to the narrative that China’s Christianity is popular among young Chinese, surveys generally find they are less likely than their elders to identify as Christian. They are also less likely to believe in the Christian God or attend Christian worship services. Furthermore, the CGSS, conducted between 2006 and 2018, indicates Chinese adults younger than 35 years have become significantly less likely to identify as Christian over time, contrary to the assertion that Christianity is growing more popular among young Chinese.

In this study, we also addressed concerns about the ability of recent surveys to accurately reflect Christian trends by conducting two analyses. First, we compared re-interview rates between self-identified Christians and other respondents in the CFPS, and found no evidence that Christians have become less likely to participate in interviews. Second, using data from the 2006 and 2018 CGSS, we analyzed response patterns of urban residents and young Chinese adults with a college education: the subgroups whose responses in surveys are especially likely to be affected by political circumstances. In line with the observations of Francis-Tan (2023), our findings of no significant interaction effects between survey year and urban/rural residence and between survey year and college education suggest that the government’s tightened control over religion since President Xi Jinping came to power has had little impact on survey responses in recent years. Indeed, survey data about religious (zongjiao) participation among Christians are similar in data collected before and after Xi came to power. In the 2008 CGSS, about 72 percent of self-identified Christians say they participate in religious activity at least a few times a year, and the share was 73 percent in the 2018 CGSS.²⁴ Such stability was not observed among self-identified Buddhists, whose share of frequent attenders dropped from 58 percent to 36 percent over the same time.

Although we cannot be absolutely certain whether surveys accurately capture Christian trends in China, it is plausible that China’s Christian population has plateaued or even begun to decline in the twenty-first century. The government’s intensified scrutiny of Christian activities in recent decades, including the cross-removal campaign in Zhejiang and other provinces and the “Sinicization of religions,” has made Christianity an increasingly sensitive topic in China (Pew Research Center 2023a). Additionally, the government has stepped up efforts to regulate unauthorized churches and intensified crackdown on unauthorized churches that refuse to join the state-controlled associations.

Scholars have different perspectives on whether the government’s tightened control is stifling Christian growth. Some argue that this shift in political context will have little or only modest impact on slowing the growth of Christianity. For example, in his recent talk about the rise of Christianity in China, Yang (2023) claimed that China would become the largest Christian nation “very soon,” but acknowledged this might be delayed for a couple of decades because of the government’s actions. This view aligns with the “triple-market model” Yang (2006) proposed to understand China’s religious landscape. He argued that heavy regulation of religion does not lead to religious decline but will push believers into a “gray market,” which includes legally ambiguous groups that are largely neglected by the state. Yang has widely claimed (in interviews, talks, and blogs) that the Chinese government’s effort to contain Christian growth will not succeed and may instead fuel expansion. As evidence, he cites the tripling of China’s Christian population between 1949 and 1979, three years after the end of Cultural Revolution, and he draws parallels to Christian growth in the fourth century Roman Empire (Danello 2018; Domínguez 2015; Yang 2015, 2022; Zambrano 2021).

However, some are less optimistic about the future trajectory of Christianity in China. Sun (2017) contended that Christian growth in China is contingent on the social and political context and urges scholars to bring the state—the powerful actor that shapes that context—back to the analysis of factors driving the phenomenal rise of Christianity in reform-era China. She argued that while much of the earlier growth can be attributed to the institutional features of house churches, such as fervent evangelism and efficient organizational structure that scholars have pointed out (Bays 2012; Koesel 2013; Vala and O’Brien 2007), the strengths of Christian organizations are “useless” if the state is determined to crack down on them (Sun 2017).

Yang and Sun disagree about the state’s relation to the social space that house churches operate in. Yang described it as “gray market,” with activities that the state struggles to regulate such as Christian families gathering at home to discuss beliefs with their young children. Sun argued that because of the state’s restraint in using coercion and incapacity to rigorously regulate unauthorized religious activities, Christianity in China operates in “interstitial social space.” She stated that Christian growth during the reform era was possible largely because the state prioritized economic development, and local authorities were not interested in taking aggressive actions against unregistered Christian groups. This logic also is used in other studies focusing on the complicated relations between local authorities and unauthorized religious groups. For instance, Weller (2014) observed that the government often manages such groups by “pretending not to notice violations of the regulations,” which created a social space for unregistered churches to thrive outside the official system. Similarly, Vala (2017) noticed that the spread of unregistered churches across China did not occur in the space overlooked by the state, but with the authorities’ “tacit permission.”

The intensified scrutiny of unauthorized Christian activity has reduced the capacity for house churches to operate independently. Government reports from local religious bureaus and united front work department offices indicate that local authorities have been carrying out a program of “connecting unauthorized meeting points with an official church (yitangdaidian 以堂带点)” and conducting investigations of unregistered churches. For instance, in 2018, in the local authorities of Shanghai’s Fengxian district identified 86 unauthorized Christian sites and accepted 73 into the official system (see Pew Research Center 2023c). Anecdotal reports also confirm the narrative of shrinking space for house churches. In a recent article discussing the Chinese government’s 2023 update on regulations on religious sites, Vala (2024) wrote that since the 2010s, about a third of churches in some areas have been closed and meeting points in rural areas have been banned.

In summary, China’s Christian population seems to be plateauing. The government’s scrutiny and crackdown on unregistered Christian activity in recent years may have prevented some Chinese people from becoming or remaining Christian. The official ban on religious education and activity for children, for example, may be inhibiting the transmission of Christian identity to the next generation, as evidenced by the fact that younger cohorts, those born in 1980s and later, are less likely to identify as Christian in the CGSS.

We acknowledge limitations of this study. First, because of the lack of repeated measures of Christian belief and practice in surveys, we cannot track how various beliefs and practices associated with Christianity have changed among the Chinese public in recent decades. We do not know, for example, whether overall belief in Jesus Christ or attendance at Christian worship services (i.e., zuo libai) has risen, declined or remained stable. Our analysis of the age patterns in Christian identification, belief and practice suggest they may have been stable in the recent decades. Second, our study is mostly descriptive, and it does not attempt to explain the lack of Christian growth, identify factors that have contributed to the trends since 2001, or make predictions about the future trajectory of Christianity in China.

We do not contend that surveys are the only tool to estimate the number of Christians in China and to assess the trends of Christianity. Rather, in this study, we review evidence about the growth trajectory of China’s Christian population by combing through all available sources, including surveys, which provide helpful insights into the demographic characteristics of Chinese Christians. Our analysis reveals no clear support for the notion of ongoing Christian growth since the 2000s.

The recent plateau in Christian identification levels could be temporary. Scholars have observed that believers in China are often “consumers” who turn to gods and religious rituals when the need arises (Chau 2011). Subsequently, there is considerable movement into and out of religion (Francis-Tan and Tian 2022). It is possible that China could experience another wave of religious revival if the political circumstances shifted to encourage religious beliefs and practices, or if Chinese people are pushed into a dire situation in which more people turn to religion for protection or blessing. During the coronavirus pandemic, Chinese people were more likely to search for religion-related terms online and in other countries, some people said the pandemic strengthened their religious faith (Pew Research Center 2021; Ruan, Vaughan, and Han 2023). Although Christian shares in China may go up or down in the future, available evidence indicates that Christians are not currently on a trajectory to make up a majority of the country’s population by midcentury.