A clear-sighted view of conjunctural analysis is offered through these three windows: the historical; the materialist; and the scientific-utopian. First, I explain the subject-object split through the lens of the dialectic of thought and history. Second, the dialectic of part and whole, difference and totality, provides a way into identifying clearer starting points for conjunctural analysis. Finally, the dialectic of past and future is found to be the key to conjunctural analysis as a distinctively speculative, strategic and action-oriented method amongst historical materialist approaches to social change.
Historicism: subject and object, thought and history
Marx traces the historical development of capitalism as a contradictory social formation that emerged through the generalisation of the historically unprecedented alienation between subject and object (
Marx, 2024). Through violent acts of enclosure and primitive accumulation, commoners (subjects) were divorced from the means of subsistence (objects) – and capital and the wage-relation stepped into that gap, as mediator. The conditions for reproduction now appear external to the worker, beyond their control, as an abstract alienated object – the products of their labour objectified as commodities, mediated by the commodity form, made concrete as money. The notion of
mediation of the relations of production – and life – therefore becomes ‘very important’ in Marx's method (
Rose, 2025: 8). Social relations which under feudal and pre-capitalist formations appeared immediate and part of an organic unity now appear mediated, external and alien (
Cox, 2013: 9). Objectified relations thus appear as thing-like or ‘reified’ – like money – taking on a life of their own, working behind the backs of producers cut off from the life process, compelled to sell their labour as an object to survive. This is the basis of impersonal power under capitalism that disciplines both capitalists and labourers, held together in conflictual mutual dependence.
Two developments emerge from this original alienation: reification (relations appearing thing-like); and escalating contradictions driving the emergence of a socio-spatial totality. First, reification. Marx's method ‘traces the mediation […] of immediate experience and shows that experience to be abstract, by which that means that some of the things we think we are experiencing immediately turn out to be the result of a long development’ (
Rose, 2025: 8). Our immediate experience of money, for instance, or the liberal-bourgeois notion of the individual citizen with rights, makes such objects appear as given, naturalised and transhistorical, when in fact they are historically produced relations, specific to a particular mode of production. Marx's method is to unmask the real relations behind the mystifying appearances of capitalism and bourgeois ideology; to show how seemingly transhistorical objects as the ‘individual producer’ – the Robinson Crusoe of British political economy – are
not the static point of departure or transhistorical axiom of analysis but rather the dynamic result of a historical process that renders subjects as separate and thing-like, obscuring their real dialectical relation.
Marx shows how certain epistemological ways of seeing the world – positivism, empiricism, rationalism, idealism – are themselves historically specific, the products of bourgeois ideology and enabling of – by sustaining the illusion of separation – the continued reproduction of capitalist relations in the service of class domination. Marx's method is to reveal the real relations between elements presented as reified entities – the individual, property, money – and then demonstrate how these phenomenal appearances are actually deeply functional to the system's maintenance and self-expansion. On that basis alone, we must ask what kind of ideological work an ‘empiricist’ and ‘rationalist’ approach to conjunctural analysis is really doing?
Marx's method troubles the notion of an ‘objective’ science of investigating conjunctural situations from an explicitly non-normative or rationalist perspective. Marx turned Hegel's dialectical method on its head to advance a materialist philosophy of mediation and internal relations that demonstrates how abstract identities posited as autonomous and standalone concepts, as objects devoid of contradiction or connection with other identities, is an impossibility, an idealist delusion (
Hall, 2003;
Marx, 1973). Moreover, the subject-object split entrenched by capitalism not only precipitates the reification of relations of production, but also arguably of
knowledge. Money steps into the gap between worker and product; ‘science’ steps into the gap between knowing subject and studied object. Thus, bourgeois social science – positivism, rationalism, empiricism – sees the knower as somehow independent and detached from the reality they observe and measure, as externally related to their objects of knowledge, just as a worker is divorced from the means of subsistence.
This is the basis of Hegel's idealist belief in the ‘absolute autonomy’ of thought as well as positive science's notion of ‘objectivity’: ‘this constitutes an idealist problematic […] No formalist reduction – whether of the Hegelian, positivist, empiricist or structuralist variety – escapes this stricture’ (
Hall, 2003). Indeed, Althusser's purported ‘epistemological break’ between the humanist, Hegelian ‘ideology’ of the young Marx and the ‘science’ of the mature Marx, is a structuralist dead-end stuck in this idealist problematic (
Thomas, 2011). Against Althusser's ‘philosophy of science’,
Hart (2024) advocates – building on Peter D
Thomas (2011) – for Gramsci's ‘philosophy of praxis’ as the basis for any politically meaningful conjunctural analysis. Positing the scientific observer as objective is anti-democratic in its idealist delusion over the independence of thought. Dialectical thinking, however, is profoundly materialist and, even, democratic – always working through the other, through dialogue and real relations (
Ollman, 2003).
4Marx saw thought and the material reality it attempts to apprehend as a ‘differentiated unity’ – each irreducible to the other, with their own inner workings, but mutually articulated through historical development. Thought is the ‘working up of observation and conception’, mediated by the thinker-observer, who is in turn mediated by the historically-produced society in which they find themselves (
Hall, 2003). Or, in Burawoy's (2009: 9) words, ‘we are living history as we do research’. Knower transforms the knowable, and vice versa: thought does not reflect history impassively; it actively shapes it.
If indeed objectivity is dialectically related to subjectivity, we must reject interpretations of conjunctural analysis that posit objectivity without normativity, without a standpoint. This provides a materialist – and scientific – basis for understanding conjunctural analysis as essentially normative, political and historical. Conjunctural analysis is an especially self-conscious attempt at foregrounding this reflexive relation between thought and history, intentionally putting analysis to work in shaping history.
Materialism: totality and difference, objectivity and subjectivity
If the first development of the original alienation between subject and object is reification, the second is the opening of a deep contradiction between what
Cox (2013: 9) characterises as ‘[o]bject-less subjects and objects that appear to be independent of any subjectivity: just existing as capital with their own logic beyond the control of anybody’. This sets in motion contradictions – ‘sellers without buyers and buyers without sellers; capital that remains uninvested; debts that cannot be paid; factories without raw-materials’ (
Cox, 2013: 9) – causing inequality, waste, pollution, conflict, instability and periodic crisis, whose attempted resolution by the state leads only to the displacement or temporary suspension of such contradictions. These systemic disequilibria and class antagonisms provide the forward motion of history, catalysing the crisis dynamics that spill out across what becomes a socio-spatial ‘totality’ held together through increasingly planetary relations of exploitation, expropriation and extraction. In its drive for expansion, capital tends towards totalisation (
Conroy, 2024a;
Goonewardena, 2018;
Jameson, 1988;
O’Kane, 2021).
The contradictions of the subject-object split are expressed in ecological relations, too. The ‘metabolic rift’ – long-term soil fertility sacrificed for short-term productivity – is displaced and scaled up, from soil depletion to climate breakdown, from the nitrogen cycle to the carbon cycle, as successive technological subsidies attempt, in vain, to prop up ecological shortfall, producing rifts elsewhere: an escalating process of ‘rifts and shifts’ (
McClintock, 2010). This confirms our shared global biophysical space-time – the geological
totality of the Anthropocene or, rather, Capitalocene (
Moore, 2015). The metabolic rift finds spatial expression, and exacerbation, in the town and country divide, whereby dispossessed peasants are forced into cities to supply labour for industry, their excrement pumped out to sea rather than recycled for soil replenishment, while rural land is enclosed and consolidated for intensive industrial agriculture (
McClintock, 2010;
Nishat-Botero and Thompson, 2025). This is an urban-rural split elaborated as the imperial core-periphery dynamics of uneven development extending across the world with the relentless colonial expansion of capitalism (
Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2013). The consequent consolidation of the world market thus brings about a socio-spatial totality that is open and shapeshifting, not closed or determined.
This is an important point that challenges mis-readings of totality as deterministic, mono-causal or totalitarian, as indeed critics render totalising theories of planetary urbanisation (see
Goonewardena, 2018). The latest world-historical thinking on colonialism and imperialism, feminist social reproduction theory and ecological marxism demonstrates that this totality, whilst woven together by the uneven global development of capitalism, is by no means
determined by capital – though value expansion is its dynamo – but rather
overdetermined by articulated relations with other, older forms of hierarchy and domination, notably patriarchy, racism, nationalism, colonialism and ecological imperialism (
Carson, 2024;
Fraser, 2022;
Gidwani and Maringanti, 2016;
Hall, 2021;
Mies, 1986;
Moore, 2015; see also
Bieler and Morton, 2024;
Collard and Dempsey, 2020;
Conroy, 2024b,
2024c;
Irvine, 2023;
Wyly, 2022). Indeed, as
Goonewardena (2018) has illuminated, dialectical theories of totality stem from diverse epistemological perspectives, not only Marxist, but notably traversing materialist-feminist, political-ecologist, anti-colonial and Black radical traditions. Such an open, emergent and materialist conception of totality lies at the heart of conjunctural analysis.
Such critical theory shows how nature, gender, race, sexuality, nationality and other forms of difference, are not ‘constitutive outsides’ beyond capitalism (
Conroy, 2024a). For this would suspend relational and dialectical thinking at the borders of apparently autonomous spaces and non-capitalist others – such as those conceptualised by JK Gibson-Graham (2006; see also
Collard and Dempsey, 2020) – treated as external to the totality of relations that constitutes the world and, ironically, reproducing not only the Eurocentric, masculinist, colonial gaze of the pure and pristine, backward and under-developed ‘space-time of the other’ (
Conroy, 2024a) but so too reproducing the very mystifying reifications that atomise, fragment, divide and demobilise us and which critical theory was forged specifically to demystify (
O’Kane, 2021). ‘If there is no insistence upon totality’, wrote
Lefebvre (2002: 181), ‘theory and practice accept the “real” just as it is, and “things” just as they are: fragmentary, divided and disconnected’.
A dialectical approach understands totality not as a static, closed object but a dynamic, open process of totalisation, whose different parts develop
relatively autonomously from, but always in relation to, each other, changing the totality as its constituent parts evolve and whose functional interactions get reconstructed through crisis, contestation and struggle (
Conroy, 2024a;
Goonewardena, 2018;
Halvorsen, 2025;
Jameson, 1988;
Jay, 1984;
O’Kane, 2021). Mediation between part and whole is thus vital to this dynamic process of totalisation, which opens the space for agency, interruption, divergence, resistance, transformation – the subjective making of objective history. In his incisive clarifier on planetary urbanisation,
Goonewardena (2018: 463) argues that
the concept of totality is nothing if not the mediation of object by subject and subject by object, that is ‘the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process’, wherein for Lukács (1971/1922: 3, 186) ‘history is the history of the unceasing overthrow of the objective forms that shape the life of man’.
There are two vital aspects of Lukács’ notion of totality here: the mediation that produces those ‘objective forms that shape the life of man’; and the subjective standpoint that provokes the ‘unceasing overthrow’ of those objective forms. In other words, we have objective totality itself, and the subjective apprehension of that totality and its potential collective remaking through history.
First, how has mediation produced an objective totality? And what does this totality look like today, in the current conjuncture? Key here is Marx's dialectical method of grasping how contradictory parts – pulled apart by capital – form a
differentiated unity through the process of mediation (see also
Ollman, 2003). For instance, production appears to take place independently of consumption, and vice versa, undertaken by different subjects and at different sites and locations, whose functional differentiation is inscribed into space through the uneven zoning of farm, factory and home, central business district, suburb and slum. And yet, as
Hall (2003: 122) interprets Marx, ‘production and consumption also mediate one another. By “mediate” here, Marx means that each cannot exist, complete its passage and achieve its result, without the other. Each is the other's completion. Each provides within itself the other's object. Thus, production's product is what consumption consumes’. Each, therefore, requires
circulation of products and value, facilitated by an infrastructural circuitry, to enable this mediated separation, this relation of 'mutual dependence'. This raises a significant point – that mediation takes spatial form as (planetary) urbanisation, the ‘medium, site and expression of diverse, multiscalar political-economic processes’ (
Brenner, 2019: 253) and ‘confluence of daily rhythms’ (
Kipfer, 2023: 16) that are in turn managed and mediated but never fully controlled or captured by the state and capital (
Conroy, 2024c;
Goonewardena et al., 2008) – a point returned to in the conclusion.
Production and consumption – like labour and capital, subject and object, subjective needs and objective (re)production, core and periphery, urban and rural, value and waste – are thus mutually ‘indispensable’,
necessary for each other's existence, yet appear as ‘external to each other’ (Marx, quoted in
Hall, 2003: 123). The wage-relation is an ‘external necessity’: ‘as necessary from the standpoint of the individual but contingent as to whether or not wage work will actually be found’ (
Cox, 2013: 9). In seeking to extend Marx's conception of capital so that it better captures capitalism's still-unfolding totalising articulation with other social forms, we might add further relations to these examples of mediation by external necessity – namely, gendered subjugation, racialised colonialism and ecological imperialism (
Carson, 2024;
Fraser, 2022;
Gidwani and Maringanti, 2016;
Hall, 2021;
Mies, 1986;
Moore, 2015; see also
Bieler and Morton, 2024;
Collard and Dempsey, 2020;
Conroy, 2024b,
2024c;
Irvine, 2023;
Wyly, 2022). Such theorising demonstrates how uncommodified and non-capitalised spaces of unwaged work by human and non-human natures form an externalised and disavowed though
externally necessary counterpart to capitalised spaces of wage-labour and the value form.
The upshot is that capitalism is only made profitable, or even viable, owing to its disavowed enrolment of non-capitalist spaces and externalised relations. Indeed, Maria Mies has long argued that the exploitation of wage-labour in capitalist production relies on the ‘superexploitation’ of non-waged or undervalued labour by ‘women, nature, peasants and colonies’ – the process by which capitalists appropriate, without paying for, ‘the general production of life, or subsistence production’ (
Mies, 1986; also quoted in
Collard and Dempsey, 2020: 243). Race, gender, ecology, and political institutions are, in Nancy
Fraser's (2022) terms, capitalism's ‘background conditions of possibility’. The biggest disavowed background condition of possibility is, perhaps, waste; the ‘waste-value dialectic’ has been conceptualised to articulate how the labour-capital relation is incorporated within a higher-order relation with waste, which mediates the production of value (
Gidwani and Maringanti, 2016; see also
Irvine, 2023). Building on this work, Jason W
Moore (2023) suggests that the expansion of commodified zones for the accumulation of capital is dependent on the even greater expansion of sacrifice zones and spaces of waste – understood relationally as material waste, dumping grounds and commons (spaces and populations ‘wasted’, leftover by capital).
Rebecca
Carson (2024: 11) argues that non-capitalist elements within capitalist totality are ‘immanent externalities’, in that ‘they are required for formal circulation to take place and provide the basis for capital's reproduction processes […] and remain other to capital’. Carson suggests that the ‘displaced site of contradiction within capitalist social relations ought to be located in the tension between capitalist and non-capitalist elements of capital's circulation’. The contradiction between capital and labour is no longer capitalism's central point of conflict, displaced to the boundaries between internalised/capitalised and externalised/non-capitalised spaces. Read alongside
Fraser's (2022) conceptualisation of the ‘boundary struggles’ marking the restructuring between background conditions of possibility, we can see how contestation over capital's contradictory relationship to such ‘immanent externalities’ might produce the crises that, I argue, are the object of conjunctural analysis.
5Where might we look for these conjunctural crises?
Moore (2015) convincingly argues in his ‘world-ecological’ approach that capital accumulation based on
exploitation depends on an even greater growth in
appropriation of uncommodified natures and non-capitalised spaces; that crises of accumulation are only ever ‘resolved through great waves of geographical restructuring’ (
Moore, 2015: 100) and spatial fixes that redraw boundaries between exploitation and expropriation, core and periphery, value and waste; and that, crucially, this entails the violent reorganisation of geographies of reproduction, with ‘new imperialisms, new forms of racist brutality, and new modes and scales of gendered social reproductive work’ (
Conroy, 2023: 1101–1102). Here enters the state and the extra-economic forces of imperialism and nationalism – extremely important to the development of capitalism, and generative and ameliorative of conjunctural crises (
Hart, 2020). To resolve crises of overaccumulation and combat falling rates of profit, capitalism requires periodic injections of ‘external natures’ (
Conroy, 2024a) – both taps of unpaid work/energy and sinks for waste – and the state steps in to devise and institutionalise novel methods, techniques and technologies of extraction, to forcibly enrol otherwise externalised and unrelated humans and non-human natures into new regimes of accumulation.
In other words, the superexploitation identified by Mies is knitted together by a broader range of relations – not just the
impersonal domination of the commodity relation, but also the
personal and
interpersonal dominations of gender, race and the colonial nation-state, including by ‘force and coercion’ (
Mies, 1986: 48; also quoted in
Collard and Dempsey, 2020: 243).
Carson (2024) goes further, still, to argue that personal and interpersonal forms of domination based on race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, (dis)ability and age – theoretically sidelined by the impersonal domination of capital's value-form – are specifically back on the rise in this historical conjuncture. This, she explains, is because capitalism has attempted to resolve accumulating crises by investing in fictitious capital – speculative financialised products that are essentially unrealised value claims on future labour exploitation and unwaged value extraction. To ward off devaluation and further crises in the post-2008 conjuncture of secular stagnation and exhausted ‘cheap natures’ (
Moore, 2015), capitalists have been forced to switch investment from productive into fictitious capital, thus placing additional pressures on externalised colonies and frontier zones at capital's colonial boundaries, as well as intensifying forms of domination in what Mies described as the ‘internal colonies’ of the household and gendered and racialised spaces of social reproduction; ‘the household is a colony, dominated by the metropolis, capital and state’ (
Mies, 1986: 32; also quoted in Collard and Dempsey, 2020). ‘The variable of social reproduction, therefore’, argues
Carson (2024: 5), ‘lies at the heart of fictitious capital's circulation, being required to reproduce both labour in the present and labour for the future’. In short, crises of social reproduction will only intensify until the conjuncture is ruptured through structural forces or political intervention. Might conjunctural analysis usefully attend to those spaces and moments of force and intervention, mediated by social, political and cultural crises?
Regimes of accumulation that extract value through planetary chains of interpersonal as well as impersonal domination are secured by technologies of
coercion – in Gramscian terms – and
consent, through ideology and common sense. This is the basis of hegemony, or leadership for class domination of society and nature (
Ekers et al., 2012;
Thomas, 2011). For Gramsci, the bourgeoisie is the first class in history to pursue hegemony – the generalised extension of bourgeois ways of life for upholding class domination – which, following the successful ‘active’ revolution of the French Jacobins in 1789, has taken the form of ‘passive revolution’, reactionary transformations that maintain domination in the face of weakening ‘affective attachments’ (
Anderson and Secor, 2025) and subaltern revolt (see
Hart, 2024: 148–150). Conjunctural analyses have traditionally sought to diagnose, and subvert, passive revolutions – fascism in the 1930s, authoritarian neoliberalism in the 1980s, and ‘revanchist populisms’, ‘Trump-Bannonisms’ and other reactionary-chauvinist nationalisms today (
Clarke, 2023;
Hart, 2020;
Woolston and Mitchell, 2025).
Important here is
Gramsci's (1971: 197; Q13§23) notion of the ‘organic’, underlying the ‘conjunctural’, whereby a ‘crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades’ with seemingly ‘incurable structural contradictions’ such that
political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them […] These incessant and persistent efforts […] form the terrain of the ‘conjunctural’, and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organise.
The terrain of the conjunctural, then, is one of struggle for hegemony, under conditions of passive revolution, in which ‘relations of force’ play out across various levels – social, political, military – shaped by organic contradictions in regimes of accumulation (such as in the waste-value dialectic) expressed through and interlocking with conjunctural crises in politics, culture, subjectivity-formation and common sense (see also
Hart, 2024). Such contradictions may condense into a
crisis of authority in which popular consent and governing legitimacy are threatened (
Clarke, 2023), whereby ‘affective attachments’ to dominant ideologies – liberalism, nationalism, populism – fracture and fray (
Anderson and Secor, 2025). Conjunctural thinking is uniquely oriented to getting at, and unravelling, those stitching points in hegemonic articulations; its object of analysis is the decomposition and re-composition, under crisis conditions, of the relations of force that hold together articulations of hegemonic social formations.
‘But the most important observation to be made about any concrete analysis of the relations of force’, wrote
Gramsci (1971: 194–195; Q13§17; my emphasis), is
that such analyses cannot and must not be ends in themselves (unless the intention is merely to write a chapter of past history), but acquire significance only if they serve to justify a particular practical activity, or initiative of will. They reveal the points of least resistance, at which the force of will can be most fruitfully applied; they suggest immediate tactical operations; they indicate how a campaign of political agitation may best be launched, what language will best be understood by the masses, etc. The decisive element in every situation is the […] force which can be put into the field when it is judged that a situation is favourable.
This shows clearly how conjunctural analysis is to be distinguished from merely social-scientific situational analysis, as a politically active orientation towards articulating the relations of force that structure any conjuncture in ways that ‘reveal’, ‘suggest’, ‘indicate’ and ‘judge’ which strategies and tactics to deploy in such situations for the subaltern struggle for hegemony.
At its most abstract, conjunctural analysis might identify, dissect, narrate and explain those geo-historical situations in which, as Stuart Hall (
Hall and Massey, 2010: 38; see also Clarke, 2018) defined a ‘conjunctural crisis’,
these ‘relatively autonomous’ sites – which have different origins, are driven by different contradictions, and develop according to their own temporalities – are nevertheless ‘convened’ or condensed in the same moment. Then there is crisis, a break, a ‘ruptural fusion’.
A conjuncture, therefore, is not simply some impartial assemblage, composite or situation, but rather a politically charged and reflexive space-time in dialectical relation with totality in which contradictions ‘are condensed, or, as Althusser said, “fuse in a ruptural unity”’ and which contain antagonisms and struggles through which history is driven forward, ‘from one conjuncture to another’ (
Hall and Massey, 2010: 57). Intervening in this forward motion of history is what conjunctural analysis must set out to do. And it must necessarily be launched from a particular subjective standpoint, even if history lacks an identifiable subject or clear-cut agent.
This brings us to the second aspect of Lukács’ notion of totality: subjectivity. For
Lukács (1972) the subjective standpoint of the proletariat gives it privileged insight into the objective unfolding of history under capitalism, for only the proletariat has experienced the internal split between subject and object – rendered both commodified object (labour-power) and collective subject able to shift history through cooperation and class struggle (see also
Jameson, 1988;
Jay, 1984). The ‘self-knowledge of its own social situation’, the experience of being subjected to exploitation – turned into a unique commodity, labour-power – is the basis for the proletariat's embodied knowledge of the original contradiction, alienation, and therefore, its privileged insight into capitalist totality in all its brutal contradictions; ‘the self-understanding of the proletariat is therefore simultaneously the objective understanding of the nature of society’ (
Lukács, 1972: 149). And this is also the basis for its contemporary extension to other subjectivities beyond the proletariat, starting with feminist standpoint theory (see
Goonewardena, 2018: 465–466).
This is the epistemological starting point, I would argue, for conjunctural analysis. A conjuncture can only really be apprehended from a standpoint within the totality. But the proletariat is not some subjective identity that we can locate in an individual subject – the figure of the waged working class – but rather a principle of
relation within and to totality that cuts across many intersectional subjectivities; an
orientation to totality from various positions of domination; the variegated standpoint for grasping (and thus potentially unmasking and transforming) the reified illusions of our open totality. This is the epistemological rationale of that ‘emancipatory ethico-political standpoint’ that
Leitner and Sheppard (2020: 495) identify as animating conjunctural analysis. If conjunctural analysis is about apprehending totality from a particular standpoint in its articulated socio-spatial relations, then, owing to the way capitalism is (increasingly) dependent on unpaid work and energy, this standpoint must be interpreted expansively as a dialectical relation expressed in many different subjectivities and dominated positionalities, from wage-labourers to domestic labourers, from wage-slaves to chattel slaves, from peasants to waste workers, from manual to intellectual workers, from human to non-human nature – anyone and anything that produces value, by way of either exploitation or expropriation.
A big part of conjunctural analysis, then, is articulating connections between these various subjectivities to construct a cross-class coalition – the difficult political-cultural work of building a historic bloc across various levels, sites and scales (
Clarke, 2023). This speaks to the second sense in which Gramsci employed articulation – as giving expression, voice or
form to, as well as linking or connecting together in
formation – and suggests the importance of translation and linguistic representation for the praxis orientation of conjunctural analysis (see Thompson et al., 2025: 49–51). Translation is a critical component of Gramscian conjunctural analysis in multiple senses: translating across difference to articulate a common sense that can speak to many different allied (but, under capitalism, pluralised, fragmented and divided) subjectivities; translating complex theoretical formulations into more vernacular forms for popular understanding to grasp opportunities for intervention; translating stories and archives of the past into visionary strategies and practical tactics for the present; translating radical ideas from one place or space to another (
Kipfer and Mallick, 2022;
Lorne et al., 2026).
Scientific speculation: past and future, abstract and concrete, theory and praxis
Finally, I turn to Marx's ‘scientific’ approach to prefiguring a different future from present contradictions. The ‘peculiar difficulty’ of Marx's method, wrote
Hall (2003), is the ‘methodological requirement laid on his readers […] to maintain […] two modes of theoretical analysis’: the
historical (diachronically attendant to contingent formation and emergence) and the
structural (synchronically attendant to necessary form and function). In other words, capitalism's
becoming and
being (see
Bieler and Morton, 2024: 6). In
Capital, Marx's method was to understand the present functioning of capital by working backwards into history to map its historical determinants (i.e. money becoming capital). Intriguingly,
Hall (2003: 138) suggests that, for Marx, ‘the historical conditions for the appearance of a mode of production
disappear into its results’. That is, through the hegemonic extension of capital and its tendency to obscure its relational and historical production through reification, it covers its own tracks and begins to presuppose as transhistorical its own emergent dynamics. This is its extraordinary power that awes and blinds us to its operations: one of its ‘truly staggering aspects’ (
Hall et al., 2013: 140); and the reason why, for
Hall (2003: 138), Marx seeks to approach capital from an ‘essentially synchronic, structuralist’ approach as an abstract system, an ‘“anatomical” analysis of the structure of the capitalist mode’ – to meet capital at its own game, perhaps.
Marx often switches gear between structuralist and more historicist registers – the latter moving in the opposite direction, from the abstract (phenomenal appearances) to the concrete (real relations). Marx's historical method thus traces the genesis of bourgeois society and evolution of capitalism as a concrete social formation, whereby capitalism becomes dynamic and open-ended, rather than the more closed systematic analysis of its essential inner workings. If conjunctural analysis can be located within this dual dialectic of Marx's method – systematic analysis of abstract form; historical genealogy of concrete formation – it sits in the latter, historicist register, always beginning with the historical and the concrete. Conjunctural analysis is oriented towards discerning how socio-spatial totality is historically unfolding through conjunctural crisis conditions – what critical realists would call the ‘contingent’ – in ways which begin to shift its ‘necessary’ movements.
6If critical realism makes a clear-cut distinction between necessary and contingent relations, as a dualism (see
Cox, 2013), then conjunctural analysis, I would argue, problematises or brackets that distinction. Critical realism suggests contingently related objects can exist independently or ‘externally’ to each other, whereas in the case of necessary relations, the relation is ‘internal’: ‘the nature of the relata depends on the relation itself’ (
Conroy, 2024b). In his exegesis of the contingency/necessity debate for the question of how race and capital are related, William
Conroy (2024b: 48, 46) reads race as ‘among those entrenched, embedded, and spatialised contingencies’, as ‘a
contingent, relatively autonomous, and highly path-dependent terrain of struggle (re)produced in dialectical relation to the abstract level dynamics and requirements of capital’. Here, the ‘necessary’ relations of
capital as a logical
form are helpfully demarcated from the more ‘contingent’ relations of
capitalism as a concrete
formation. The domain of conjunctural analysis, then, lies precisely at the sharp-edged coalface of the shifting contours between the necessary and the contingent within capitalism as a concrete historical formation.
What do I mean by this? That conjunctural crises represent openings in organic structures that may, if replicated and compounded, begin to redraw the boundaries between contingency and necessity.
Conroy (2024b) implicitly concedes the permeability – despite arguing for the critical realist distinction – between necessity and contingency in recognising that the necessary ‘laws’ of capital require updating over time, to now include, for instance,
Moore's (2015) insight into ‘capital's need to maintain a “zone” of extra-economic expropriation greater than its ‘zone’ of capitalization’ (
Conroy, 2024b: 46). If, indeed, conjunctural analysis lacks the tools to work this out, what it can do instead is identify moments of crisis that condense contradictions and put pressure on the ongoing historical transformation of necessary-contingent relations, through political intervention in the present, leaving the working out of contingent formation and necessary laws to other modes of historical materialist analysis.
Indeed, we cannot ask too much of conjunctural analysis.
Conroy (2024b) argues that in work on race and capital that ‘proceeds in an Althusserian and Gramscian vein’, notably Hall's, while it provides
a compelling commitment to conjunctural analysis, and to the complex combinations that might define any historical-geographical moment, we are left with either (1) a complete obfuscation of the necessity/contingency distinction […] or (2) with the sense that racism is a non-necessity to capitalist society, but without a clear sense of the necessary ‘laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production’ – the ‘major goal of Marx's investigative effort’ (
Ollman, 2003: 163) – that mediate such articulations and combinations. (
Hall (1986) alludes to these laws but does not engage them directly.)
Conroy's reading of conjunctural analysis makes the apparently reasonable critique that it only alludes to and fails to engage directly the laws of motion of capital. Yet that's precisely the point of conjunctural approaches: to hold such theoretical conceptions of capitalism's necessary structure in the background of the analytical frame to foreground and get a sharper focus on the multitudinous ways in which that structure is being contested, reshaped and rearticulated with other social forms that begin to shift its logical operations over time.
What does this look like in terms of capital's evolving relation to race? ‘Race’, for
Hall (2021[1980]: 239), ‘is, also, the modality in which class is “lived,” the medium through which class relations are experienced, the form in which it is appropriated and “fought through.”’ Crucially, capitalism's historical co-evolution with race and colonialism has
segmented the working class such that the superexploitation and appropriation of unpaid work and energies from the 'internal colonies' (
Mies, 1986) and colonial peripheries – increasingly vital for capital's viability, as per
Conroy's (2024b) argument for
Moore's (2015) new necessary law – is enabled by race and the racialisation of labour (see Hall, 2021[1980], 1986). Not only does this racial segmentation ‘leverage
racial subsidies in pursuit of profit’ (Achille Mbembe, quoted in
Bieler and Morton, 2024: 16); it also, for
Hall (2021[1980]: 239–240), ‘has consequences in terms of the internal fractioning and division within the working class’, which ‘dominates the divided class’ and shores up the ongoing reproduction of capitalist and imperialist social relations in the absence of unified class consciousness or struggle, ‘through harnessing the dominated classes to capital by means of the articulation of the internal contradictions of class experience with racism’. Race, and anti-racism, thus becomes a pivotal domain for conjunctural interventions into the ongoing transformation of capitalism; concomitant arguments can be made for ecology, gender and other forms of difference and domination.
Hall's injunction for conjunctural thinking, building on Gramsci, was ‘to address ourselves “violently” towards the present
as it is’, in all its concrete complexity (see Shock,
2020) So, by attending to capitalism
as it is – not as a simple abstraction of necessary laws but as the historically produced ‘dialectical matrix’ of race, gender and class (
Bieler and Morton, 2024) – the historically necessary or logically contingent distinction begins to blur, to fall away, become a moot point. As an epistemology, a way of seeing, conjunctural analysis focuses our attention instead on the concrete ways in which this dialectical matrix is subtly reshaped through crisis and contestation.
If critical realism moves from the abstract to the concrete, and Marx's historical method the reverse – from the concrete to the abstract – then conjunctural approaches, by contrast,
begin with the concrete and – herein lies the difference with Marx's historical method –
stay with the concrete; the abstract is kept at bay while nonetheless deeply informing the ‘concrete analysis of concrete situations’ (
Hall, 2003: 128).
7 Rather than producing theoretical abstractions from the concrete about the historical formation of capitalism, conjunctural approaches produce practical, future-oriented concrete analyses – strategies and tactics – about how that ongoing historical formation may be transformed through action. It thus takes a more forward-looking orientation to history.
A conjunctural approach to race and class, therefore, would interrogate a concrete situation in which their historical co-constitution is put under pressure by crisis conditions – a focus in which this sharp analytical distinction between necessity and contingency is analytically suspended, if not collapsed, in favour of prising openings in these changing relations for insights into alliance building and tactical manoeuvres. Put another way, whilst it is logically possible, as Conroy (2024b) argues, for capital to exist without racism, colonialism and patriarchy, it only actually exists as a dialectical matrix or differentiated unity with many determinations – the domain of the conjunctural.
The concept of the
differentiated unity is, for Hall (2003: 127), the ‘methodological and theoretical key to [the
Grundrisse] and to Marx's method as a whole’. This is the idea that we must examine
both the ‘internal structure’ of any form or relation
and ‘those other structures to which it is coupled and with which it forms’, such that ‘[b]oth the specificities and the connections – the complex unities of structures – have to be demonstrated by the concrete analysis of concrete relations and conjunctions’. Abstract forms such as the capital relation only ever exist as concrete formations with other relations, shaped by historical determinations, to form a differentiated unity of ‘many determinations and relations’ (Marx, quoted by
Hall, 2003: 127).
The concrete ways in which these relations are articulated into a differentiated unity ‘cannot be conjured out of thin air according to some essentialist dialectical law’, but ‘must be demonstrated’ by materialist analysis – Marx's ‘profane’ history (
Hall, 2003: 128, 124). The seemingly abstract value form is only realised through the ‘mediating movement’ (Marx) of capital between those moments in the circuit, from production to consumption; ‘there is no guarantee to the producer – the capitalist – that what he produces will return again to him: he cannot appropriate it “immediately”’ (
Hall, 2003: 125). Again,
mediation is pivotal – governed by determinate conditions that are ‘external’ to capital, by cultural norms and common sense, institutions and the state, waged and unwaged workers, social conflict.
This is the basis of
Hall's (1983) marxism without guarantees – ‘[n]othing except the maintenance of these determinate conditions can guarantee the continuity of this mode of production over time’ (
Hall, 2003: 125). It defines what
Hart (2024) describes as Hall's ‘distinctive’ reading of Marx and rendering of articulation as method: a Gramsci-inspired conjunctural thinking in which
conjuncture is not opposed to the
essence of structure, ‘as its surface or punctual state’, but rather enables a ‘“conjunctural” understanding of structure and its changes’ (Koivisto and Lahtinen, 2012: 276).
Importantly, this
necessary mediation of the necessary dynamics of capitalism – by
contingent determinate conditions, with ‘no guarantee that those conditions will always be fulfilled’ (
Hall, 2003: 116) – means that, for
Hall (2003: 125), capitalism is ‘a system capable of breaks, discontinuities, contradictions, interruptions: a system with limits, within historical time’. This is a point that Hart has repeatedly underlined in her theorisation of postcolonial Marxism, dialectical-relational comparison and conjunctural analysis: to locate the ‘slippages, openings, and contradictions [to] help us generate new understandings of the possibilities of social change’ (
Hart, 2006: 982;
Hart, 2024). It is precisely in this mediated gap that opportunities open up for social resistance, political contestation and potential transformation of capital and its articulated social forms of domination – and the space where we should look to begin a conjunctural analysis.
A conjunctural approach would thus analyse how these determinate conditions have come to be articulated, historically, in ways which maintain the dominating differentiated unity we call capitalism, colonialism or imperialism, with a view to acting on these conditions in the present to reshape the future. It would seek to identify points of weakness, in times of crisis, when such articulations are placed under strain, for subaltern agents to exploit strategically to their advantage, for rearticulation. This dovetails with Gilbert's (2019: 15) definition as strategic mapping: ‘The aim of conjunctural analysis is always to map a social territory, in order to identify possible sites of political intervention’. Conjunctural analysis, therefore, does not simply trace historical genesis in a backward-looking movement; it attempts something singular: to map current conditions from a more speculative orientation to history, articulating a future vision and representing the present balance of forces in ways that make their transformation seem more possible.
Such a Gramscian movement of ‘prevision’, suggests Thomas, is ‘conceived neither as prediction nor foresight, but as that which allows the present to be seen differently so as to make possible a practico-political intervention in the present’ (Thomas 2017: 299; see also
Hart, 2024). Conjunctural analysis thus reaches forward in time, as well as backwards, to explain the historical development of the present in terms that might help achieve the strategic goals of hegemonic struggle – the
final cause of conjunctural praxis (see
Thompson et al., 2025). And this, arguably, provides the basis for seeing it as an important extension, a third component, to the dual dialectic of Marx's method.
As
Hart (2020, 2024) has written widely about, a conjunctural orientation to historical change bears deep affinities with Lefebvre's ‘regressive-progressive method’: first, regressively, ‘starting in the present, working our way back to the past, and then retracing our steps’ (
Lefebvre, 1991: 66; quoted in Hart, 2024: 151); and, second, progressively projecting into the future from present conditions a ‘virtual object’, or strategic vision, such that the regressive ‘understanding of reality as a realized possibility was complemented, in
The Urban Revolution, by an understanding of possibility as the virtual aim of the current tendencies’ (
Stanek, 2008: 160). Łukasz
Stanek (2008) has elucidated how the
regressive moves, quoting
Lefebvre (2003: 24), ‘from the virtual to the actual, the actual to the past’, whilst the
progressive moves ‘from the obsolete and completed to the movement that anticipates that completeness, that presages and brings into being something new’. Hart (2018: 377) cites Stuart Elden (
2004: 38–39): ‘For Lefebvre, this [regressive-progressive method] is the dialectic at work, in the way that was discovered by Marx’.
We might thus see conjunctural analysis as the exemplary form of what Sam
Halvorsen (2025) conceptualises as ‘strategic geographies’. Citing conjunctural analysis as a prime example, Halvorsen channels Gramsci's and Lefebvre's
dramatic sense of strategy and tactics, highlighting the story-telling power and compositional purpose of strategic geographies. If, for
Lefebvre (2003),
tactics intervene directly in everyday life,
urban strategy contests the fragmentation and peripheralisation actuated by urban ideology and capitalist totality with a visionary goal and direction – a virtual object – for political projects seeking to transform that totality through urban revolution. If conjunctural analysis has any
particular purpose for critical urban research, then, it lies in its strategic capacity to map crisis conditions, evaluate the balance of forces, and formulate strategy and tactics for mobilising
urban revolutions (
Kipfer, 2023).